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INTRODUCTION 
Educational choices in Italy are plagued by large inequalities related to social 
origin. The crucial point is the transition to upper secondary school. This 
occurs typically at age 14 when children leave comprehensive education and 
choose among a variety of educational programmes with different curricular 
content and learning targets. The existing literature shows consistently that 
whereas the majority of children with high social origin attend upper 
secondary schools in the academic track, children with low parental 
education or in the working class are much more likely to attend technical 
and vocational schools (Gambetta 1987; Cavalli and Facchini 2001; 
Schizzerotto and Barone 2006; Checchi and Flabbi 2007; Contini and Scagni 
2013). Despite the educational expansion, social segregation in upper 
secondary schooling choices has further increased in the second half of the 
twentieth century (Panichella and Triventi 2014). 
Higher education participation has always been low in Italy relative to 
most other industrialized countries. University entry rates increased 
substantially with the implementation of the ‘Bologna process’ – aimed at 
harmonizing higher education systems across the EU – that introduced 
shorter bachelor programmes in 2001. However, graduation rates are still far 
below the OECD average (OECD 2014). In addition, the socio-economic 
gradient in enrolment and completion rates is large (Recchi 2007; Triventi 
and Trivellato 2009). Enrolment inequalities dropped slightly after 2001 
(Cappellari and Lucifora 2009) due to higher entry rates among high-ability 
children from the lower classes, but this trend has been only temporary 
(Argentin and Triventi 2011; Ballarino and Panichella 2014). 
The Mixed Tracking Model 2
Social origin differentials in choices relative to upper secondary and 
tertiary education seem to be considerably wider in Italy than in other 
European countries (Jackson 2013) even in relation to other stratified 
educational systems such as Germany or the Netherlands (Checchi and Flabbi 
2007; Contini and Scagni 2011). Effects given prior achievement – the so-
called secondary effects – are also large (Contini and Scagni 2013; Jackson 
2013): social origin influences educational choices well beyond the effect due 
to the better performance of children with more advantaged backgrounds. 
Interestingly, in a comparative perspective, inequalities look sharply 
different when we move from educational choices and attainment to 
achievement. Looking at PISA scores, the socio-economic gradient is 
relatively small in Italy and much closer to egalitarian Finland than to 
Germany, Great Britain, or France (OECD 2014). This evidence is puzzling. 
Given the existence of large social origin inequalities in school choices, and 
the marked differences in learning standards between upper secondary 
educational programmes, we would also expect large achievement 
differentials.  
Against this background, this chapter aims to outline a comprehensive 
overview of social background educational inequalities in Italy from the 
beginning of upper secondary schooling up to tertiary education enrolment. 
We attempt to overcome some limitations of existing research, update results, 
or offer additional descriptive findings on topics for which the existing 
evidence is scant. We focus on inequalities in educational choices and more 
specifically on inequalities in (1) upper secondary school attendance in the 
different tracks (RQ1), (2) upper secondary school dropout (RQ2), (3) track 
changes (RQ2), and (4) higher education enrolment (RQ3). In addition, we 
examine inequalities in reading and math test scores in 10th grade. All 
analyses are performed conditionally and unconditionally on prior school 
performance in order to assess how far the observed gaps are due to 
mechanisms operating over and beyond the poorer prior achievement of 
pupils with a lower social background.  
THE ITALIAN EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM 
In the past decades, the Italian schooling system has undergone several de-
tracking reforms aimed at increasing participation and reducing social 
inequalities. In 1963, lower secondary education, formerly divided into 
general education and a vocational dead end track, became comprehensive 
(scuola media unica) and the minimum school-leaving age was raised to 14. 
Access to tertiary education, previously limited to students with an academic 
diploma, was extended to all students with a five-year upper secondary 
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qualification in 1969. In 2006, the minimum school-leaving age was raised to 
16, so the majority of students now attend at least two years of upper 
secondary education.  
In the current system, students attend eight years of comprehensive 
education composed of five years of primary school (age 6–11) and three 
years of lower secondary education (age 11–14). Upper secondary education 
starts at 14 and lasts five years. Students choose among a variety of school 
types offering considerably different educational programmes. These 
programmes are classified into three broad tracks: the academic track (licei), 
the technical track (istituti tecnici), and the vocational track (istituti 
professionali). In addition to state-level education, students can opt for 2–4 
year vocational training programmes (formazione professionale) provided on 
the regional level and closely linked to local labour market needs.1 Despite 
the strongly stratified character of the Italian upper secondary education 
system, there are no ability restrictions regulating access to the different 
educational programmes. Moreover, all students with a five-year diploma 
have access to tertiary education.  
Tracks differ markedly in terms of curricula, institutional purposes, 
academic standards, and prestige. Lyceums provide general and academically 
oriented curricula; they are widely considered to be the main route to 
university. Technical institutes prepare students for technical occupations in 
economic or technological sectors, whereas vocational schools provide 
practical instruction preparing for lower level technical jobs.2 Further 
differences exist within tracks. Within the academic track, for example, 
students may choose between programmes emphasizing the humanities, 
scientific subjects, foreign languages, or the arts (the first two are widely 
considered to be substantially more demanding than the latter). 
As mentioned above, children may choose freely among these different 
school types. Lower secondary school teachers formulate recommendations, 
but they are not binding and families often ignore them. Students may change 
school and educational programme, but they need the authorization of the 
receiving institution. In practice, as we shall show, the majority of school 
changes are towards less demanding educational programmes and are usually 
a result of children’s poor performance.  
After obtaining a five-year upper secondary diploma, individuals may 
enter higher education. In general, there are no entry restrictions to the 
university system, although access to a few degree programmes is limited and 
regulated by ability-based entry tests. The Italian higher education system is 
composed largely of public universities, and there is no formal divide 
between academic programmes and polytechnic programmes aimed at 
preparing intermediate-level executives. Before 2001, the institutional length 
of degrees varied between four and six years. With the implementation of the 
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‘Bologna process’, the system has been organized into a three-year bachelor 
programme followed by a two-year master programme (with the exceptions 
of a few majors in the law and medical schools that still last 5–6 years). 
Table 18.1: Variables used in the analyses in each dataset 
 INVALSI 2013/14 IARD 2000 ISTAT 2011 
 Socio-demographic variables 
Parental education University; Upper secondary; 
No more than lower secondary education 
Gender Male; Female 
Geographical area North-West; North-East; Centre; South; Isles 
Year of birth − 1965–69; 1970–74; 
1975–80 
− 
Migration status Italian; 2nd-
generation migrant 
− − 
 Education-related variables 
High school track Academic/General; Technical; Vocational 
Track in 
10th grade 
1st track 1st track 
(only for high 
school graduates) 
plus track of 
diploma 





Very good; Excellent 
Performance in 
standardized test 
in upper sec. 
education 
10th grade 
test scores in: 
Italian 




Final mark in upper 
sec. education 
− − 60–69; 70–79;  
80–89; 90–100 
Enrolment − − Enrolment in 
university within 4 
years after diploma 
Dropout − Dropout from high 
school (among 
those aged 20 or 
more) 
− 
Source:  Own illustration. 
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DATA AND VARIABLES 
Regrettably, Italy lacks a unified micro-data archive on schooling careers. 
Therefore, we shall have to exploit different data sources covering various 
stages of the schooling career and different birth cohorts. 
The first archive comes from the National School Assessment Programme 
(INVALSI-SNV), and provides information on the population of students 
enrolled in 10th grade (i.e. second year of upper secondary education) in 
2013–14. Data include standardized test scores on Italian and Mathematics, 
information on family background, and information on the school. The 
analytical sample includes 31 265 students.3 We exploit these data to study 
the students’ allocation into the different tracks and to analyse achievement 
across tracks and social origin.  
The second data source comes from the ‘Survey on the Youth Condition’ 
by the IARD Institute in 2000 that retrospectively interviewed individuals 
aged 15–35 on different aspects of the youth condition and educational 
careers. We use these data to draw information on upper secondary school 
dropout by exploiting the information provided by individuals aged 20–35. 
The birth cohorts involved in this data archive are rather old. However, due to 
the lack of appropriate data, analysing early school leaving in Italy is difficult; 
this archive is the only source providing detailed information on social origin 
and prior performance. The analytical sample contains 1967 students. 
The third data source is the Survey of High-School Graduates (2011), 
carried out by the Italian National Statistical Institute (ISTAT) on individuals 
who attained the upper secondary diploma in 2007. It focuses on labour 
market participation and access to tertiary education. The analytical sample 
size is 26 038. We use this dataset to analyse changes across tracks in upper 
secondary school and transition to higher education.  
The variables employed in the empirical analyses in each data source are 
reviewed in Table 18.1, whereas the birth cohorts involved are to be found in 
Figure A1 in the online appendix (Contini and Triventi 2016). 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Track Placement in Upper Secondary Education 
Following the literature on primary and secondary effects, Contini and 
Scagni (2013) decomposed social background differentials in the probability 
of choosing the academic track in upper secondary school into components 
related to the indirect effect of social origin via prior performance and the 
direct effect net of prior performance. They used various editions of the Istat 
Survey of High School Graduates, adjusting for sample selection, to account 
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Table 18.2: Distribution of school track in 10th grade according to highest 
parental education and lower secondary mark (row percentages) 
School track in 10th grade 
Lyceums Technical Vocational Total 
Highest parental education     
University 70.7 20.7 8.6 100.0 
Upper secondary  44.6 37.3 18.1 100.0 
Lower secondary 24.8 38.1 37.0 100.0 
Lower secondary mark     
6 14.7 36.5 48.8 100.0 
7 29.5 44.4 26.1 100.0 
8 54.1 35.9 10.0 100.0 
9/10 79.1 17.3 3.6 100.0 
Total 46.4 33.6 19.9 100.0 
N 14 514 10 518 6233 31 265 
Source:  Own calculations based on data from Invalsi (2013–14). 
for the fact that high school dropouts were not interviewed. Secondary effects 
accounted for more than 50 per cent of the total differentials. Ress and 
Azzolini (2014) found similar results when analysing a unique local 
administrative longitudinal data archive from the Province of Trento. 
In this chapter, we exploit the data of the national learning assessment on 
10th graders (INVALSI, 2013–14) – the first release providing information 
on pre-tracking performance (the grade obtained at the lower secondary 
school final examination). Because we analyse the school type attended in 
10th grade, we look at the result of a process including (endogenous) choice 
revisions possibly due to poor performance or dissatisfaction with the 
educational programme. 
The results of multinomial regression models in terms of odds ratios (OR) 
and average partial effects (APE) are shown in Tables A2–A3 in the online 
appendix (Contini and Triventi 2016). The gross OR of entering the academic 
versus the vocational track when comparing students with tertiary educated 
parents with those with compulsory education is 15 percentage points (Model 
1), and the corresponding APE is 47 percentage points. This figure reduces 
but remains large (33 percentage points) after controlling for prior marks 
(Model 2). Similarly, the probability of attending technical versus vocational 
education increases with parental education. Previous school achievement is 
the main predictor of track placement: net of parental education, the odds of 
attending the academic track versus vocational education among those with 
very good marks (9–10) is more than 50 times that of children with only a 
‘pass’ grade (6). 
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Figure 18.1: Multinomial logistic regression of probability of track 
placement in 10th grade: predictive margins from a model with 
interaction between parental education and lower secondary 
education final mark 
Source:  Own calculations based on data from Invalsi (2013–14). 
Next, we analyse whether parental education effects differ by prior school 
marks. Sizable interaction effects exist (Figure 18.1). Students with highly 
educated parents have a higher probability of attending the academic track at 
all performance levels. Instead, the probability of attending the technical 
track differs little among low-performing students of different social origins, 
whereas among high-performing students, it is larger for those with low-
educated parents. Vocational education is very common among poor 
performing students of low social origin, but much less common among poor 
performing students with tertiary educated parents. High-performing students 
rarely choose vocational education, although the share is non-negligible (10 
per cent) among those with low parental education.4 
Finally, we decompose total inequalities into primary and secondary 
effects using the KHB method (Karlson and Holm 2011). Our findings, 
reported in Table 18.3 confirm previous research indicating that secondary 
effects account for more than one-half of the entire social background 
differentials. More specifically, when comparing the academic and technical 
tracks, only 29 per cent of the differential between high and low parental 
education and 39 per cent of the differential between high and medium 
parental education can be ascribed to differences in prior achievement (the 
corresponding figures when comparing the technical and vocational tracks 
are 50 per cent and 37 per cent). Hence, 50–71 per cent of the total 
differentials are due to the effect of other mechanisms. 
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Table 18.3: KHB decomposition analysis: primary effects as a percentage of 
the total effects (odds ratios) of parental education on track 
placement in 10th grade 




Technical vs  
vocational 
Parental education    
Lower secondary vs university 35.7 28.6 50.5 
Upper secondary vs university 38.0 39.0 36.8 
Source:  Own calculations based on data from Invalsi (2013–14). 
Upper Secondary School Dropout  
Because upper secondary education ends at age 18–19 whereas compulsory 
schooling is up to age 16, many children exit the schooling system without 
attaining a high school qualification. Indeed, some children do not even 
complete compulsory schooling. According to Eurostat (2016), the share of 
the population aged 18–24 with at most lower secondary education and not in 
further education or training has been declining constantly over the past 
decades, but it was still 17 per cent in 2013 – among the highest in Europe. 
The existence of dramatic differences related to parental education in early 
school leaving has been shown by Borgna and Struffolino (2014). Dropout is 
highly related to grade retention: children repeating a school year are much 
more likely to withdraw at an early age (Mocetti 2012).5  
Focusing on dropout after the beginning of upper secondary school, we 
complement the existing evidence by analysing early school leaving by 
parental education and prior school performance. We assess the extent to 
which family background affects dropout and whether its effect is fully 
mediated by achievement. To this end, we employ the Survey on Youth 
Conditions 2000 (IARD) that provides information on lower secondary final 
examination marks. The limitation is that it refers to rather old birth cohorts 
(1965–80). Summarizing descriptive statistics, we found that more than 7 per 
cent of the students in the sample left school without a diploma (Table A8 in 
the online appendix, Contini and Triventi 2016). This share changes across 
the tracks students first enrolled into: 3.2 per cent for the academic track, 6.4 
per cent for the technical track, and 19.7 per cent for the vocational track.  
We analyse the dropout risk using binomial logistic regression models (see 
Table A9 in the online appendix, Contini and Triventi 2016). Although prior 
school performance is the main predictor of dropout, social background 
inequalities are marked: the gross dropout odds are almost 11 times higher 
among students with low-educated parents than among those with high-
educated parents (Model 1). Differentials by parental education are explained 
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Figure 18.2: Binomial logistic regression of probability of dropout (left) and 
downward track mobility from the academic track (right): 
predictive margins from the interaction between parental 
education and lower secondary education mark 
Source:  Own calculations based on data from Iard (2000) and Istat (2011). 
only partly by achievement: given the final examination mark at lower 
secondary school, the OR between high and low educated parents is 5.9 
(Model 2). These results do not change substantially when accounting for 
track at first enrolment (Model 3).  
Among very low-performing students, predicted dropout probabilities vary 
between 3–4 per cent for high parental education and 23 per cent for low 
parental education. Whereas the dropout probability is nearly zero among 
well-performing students from the medium-high social strata, it is non-
negligible among the well-performing students of the lowest stratum (Figure 
18.2, left panel).6  
Mobility across Tracks 
What happens at entrance into upper secondary education? Can students 
change school types easily, or are there strong barriers across tracks? Do we 
observe only descending track mobility, or do children also upgrade their 
initial choice? We provide some descriptive evidence on the permeability of 
track barriers and the direction of changes by exploiting the latest wave of the 
Survey on High-School Graduates (ISTAT). The data include the school type 
individuals chose immediately after the end of lower secondary school and 
the school type at graduation. Hence, these data allow us to examine only 
school type changes of individuals who successfully completed upper 
secondary education.7  
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In this exercise, we define mobility by comparing track of entrance with 
track of diploma. Horizontal changes (within-track) are not considered. A 
total of 4.7 per cent of high school graduates changed track during upper 
secondary education. Track changes were more frequent among students who 
first entered the academic track (6.1 per cent), followed by those who first 
entered vocational education (4.2 per cent) and technical education (3.2 per 
cent) (Table A10 in the online appendix, Contini and Triventi 2016).  
Downward mobility is more frequent than upward mobility (3.8 per cent 
vs 0.9 per cent). Hence, although formal changes between educational 
programmes are possible, it is very difficult to upgrade initial choices and 
move to programmes with a higher academic content. Closer moves 
(academic–technical and technical–vocational) are more frequent: among the 
high school graduates who first entered the academic track, 4.2 per cent 
moved to technical education and only 1.9 per cent to vocational education.  
We then use logit regression to analyse downward mobility among 
children who first entered the academic track (Table A11 in the online 
appendix, Contini and Triventi 2016). Parental education relates negatively to 
downward track mobility: the gross OR between students with low and high 
parental education is 3.5 (Model 1). The OR given lower secondary school 
marks is 2.7 (Model 2). Absolute probability differentials by parental 
education are much larger for low-performing students than for high-
performing students (Figure 18.2, right panel). 
Transition to University 
Despite the expansion of the educational system and the university reform 
originating from the Bologna Process, socio-economic differentials in 
university enrolment rates are still very large. Considering the most recently 
available data on high-school graduates (2007 cohort), the enrolment 
probability differential between children with high and low parental 
education is 39 percentage points, and that between children with high and 
medium parental education is 14 percentage points (Table A13 in the online 
appendix, Model 1). These inequalities are driven largely by differences in 
upper secondary schooling. Students who obtained a diploma in the academic 
track have a probability of making the transition to university that is 54 
percentage points higher than that of students with a vocational diploma and 
33 percentage points higher than that of students with a technical diploma. 
Given the huge inequalities in track choices, social origin differentials in the 
probability of university enrolment are more than halved when controlling for 
the type of track (Model 2). Instead, the high-school final examination mark, 
although statistically significant and relevant in size, does not contribute 
much to the explanation of social origin differentials (Model 3). 
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Figure 18.3: Binomial logistic regression of probability of entering university 
within four years after diploma: predictive margins from the 
interaction between parental education and upper secondary 
education mark 
Source:  Own calculations based on data from Istat (2011). 
Figure 18.3 depicts the predicted probability of university enrolment 
conditional on upper secondary school track and final examination mark. 
Enrolment rates reflect the highly stratified character of the Italian upper 
secondary education system. Nearly all students with an academic degree and 
a very high mark make the transition to tertiary education regardless of social 
origin. However, family background is an important driver of university 
participation among lower performing students and students from the less 
prestigious tracks.  
Considering technical and vocational school graduates, the university 
enrolment gap between high and medium parental education is sizable at low 
grades and small or zero at high grades, whereas the gap between medium 
and low parental education is always substantial. 
Achievement in Upper Secondary Education 
In this section, we focus on achievement in upper secondary school as 
measured by a national-level standardized assessment of Italian (reading 
comprehension and use of language) and Mathematics in 10th graders almost 
two years after tracking. Simple descriptive evidence resulting from linear 
regression is presented in Table 18.4. As expected, achievement differentials 
across tracks are large (Model 1). On average, a child on the academic track 
obtains approximately 20–25 points (half a standard deviation) more than a 
similar child on the technical track (with slightly lower differentials in Math 
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than in Italian), and around 45 points more than a child on the vocational 
track. 
The differential between children of high and low parental education is 26 
points in Italian and 23 points in Math – that is 0.6–0.7 standard deviations 
(Model 2).8 If we examine inequalities within tracks (Model 3), the parental 
education gap decreases to 8–9 points (above 0.2 standard deviations), 
whereas when we also control for prior performance (Model 4), it goes 
further down to 4 points in Italian and 2.5 in Math. These are small but non-
negligible differentials.  
Consistent with the different curricula and learning targets, the 
performance gap between tracks remains large even after controlling for 
individual socio-demographic characteristics and prior achievement (Model 
4). In the Italian test, children on the general track obtain 13 points (0.3 
standard deviations) more than children on the technical track, and 26 points 
(0.6 standard deviations) more than those on the vocational track. 
Differentials are somewhat smaller for Math test scores.  
 
Table 18.4: Linear regression of standardized test scores in Italian and 
mathematics 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Italian 
Parental education (ref. University)     
Upper secondary   –11.2** –3.0** –0.7 
Lower secondary  –26.3** –9.3** –4.1** 
Track (ref. General)     
Technical –25.6**  –23.4** –13.0** 
Vocational –47.5**  –43.5** –26.2** 
 Mathematics 
Parental education (ref. University)     
Upper secondary   –10.5** –3.5** –1.1 
Lower secondary  –23.3** –8.0** –2.5* 
Track (ref. General)     
Technical –19.1**  –17.6** –6.7** 
Vocational –44.4**  –41.9** –23.8** 
Source:  Own calculations based on data Invalsi (2013–14). 
Notes:  + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Standardized scores: population mean = 200 and 
standard deviation = 40. Cluster robust standard errors (clusters = classes). Controls in 
all models: gender, geographical area, migrant status (1st-generation migrants 
excluded). Model 4 additionally controls for final mark in lower secondary school. 
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In a very loose sense, we could think of these figures as relative ‘value-
added’ measures of attending the different tracks (yet, this should be taken as 
a very rough indication, because unobservable personal traits – motivation or 
innate cognitive ability – are likely to operate, leading to overestimation of 
the added value).9 These results would corroborate the common knowledge 
that the different educational programmes offer substantially different 
learning opportunities.  
CONCLUSIONS 
Overall, we may draw the following conclusions. First, even in recent 
cohorts, social origin plays a decisive role in educational outcomes. Students 
from higher level backgrounds obtain better results in terms of school 
performance and achievement tests and make more prestigious school 
choices. They are more likely to enter the academic track and, later on, to 
attend university, and they are less likely to make downward moves to less 
demanding educational programmes and withdraw from upper secondary 
education. 
Second, social origin differentials are mediated only partially by school 
performance. This result holds for upper secondary school choices, dropout, 
mobility across tracks, and university attendance. We may conclude that 
social origin plays a major role in determining educational choices after 
compulsory school that goes well beyond ability differences.  
In particular, we confirm earlier findings that the effect of social origin on 
the upper secondary school track is mediated only partially by prior 
performance: secondary effects account for 50–71 per cent of the observed 
differentials. Consequently, social segregation in the Italian upper secondary 
school system is substantial: the student body composition varies greatly 
across schools in terms of achievement but also in terms of the social fabric 
(see Table A1 in the online appendix, Contini and Triventi 2016).  
Despite the socially selective process involving upper secondary school 
attendance, track mobility, and school dropout, social background plays a 
role even after the attainment of an upper secondary diploma. Higher 
education enrolment obviously depends strongly on the high school type. 
However, the enrolment probability is substantially higher for children of 
advantaged backgrounds even when comparing pupils who attended the same 
track and obtained similar grades.  
Third, our findings support the evidence that barriers across tracks are 
very strong in Italy: downward mobility is rather common, most likely 
because of poor scholastic performance, whereas upward moves are rare. 
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Fourth, despite the system’s openness in terms of absence of ability 
barriers in the key school transitions, the transition to upper secondary school 
emerges as a crucial turning point in children’s lives – particularly for those 
of low social origin. Consider the transition to university for young 
individuals of low parental education: the proportion of university entrants 
among the students who obtained a poor mark (6–7) in the final lower 
secondary examination and graduated from the academic track is 73 per cent. 
The share goes down to 52 per cent among those who obtained a very good 
mark (9–10) but graduated from the technical track, and to 30 per cent among 
those who obtained a very good mark but graduated from the vocational track 
(our elaboration on data from Istat 2011). Even though these figures cannot 
be interpreted in causal terms, they do suggest that – whether due to 
anticipatory effects or to the influence of peers, teachers, and the learning 
process – the upper secondary school choice may make a life-long difference 
for the children of disadvantaged social groups. 
Last, we provide our interpretation of the puzzling evidence that, in a 
comparative perspective, Italy stands out as a country with extremely large 
social origin inequalities in educational choices but relatively small 
achievement differentials in international assessments. According to the 
PISA study, Italy ranks rather poorly in all competence domains and has only 
few excellent scores. This evidence is consistent with a picture in which, 
despite the indubitable differences in curricula and learning standards across 
school types, the share of low-performing children in lyceums is large and 
the INVALSI test score distributions of different tracks are largely 
overlapping (Figure A4 in the online appendix, Contini and Triventi 2016).  
A potential explanation lies in the coexistence of high stratification and 
full openness of the educational system. Access to the different upper 
secondary educational programmes is completely open, fully resting on 
families’ decisions. Even access to tertiary education – characterized mostly 
by public universities – is usually not conditional on ability requirements. 
Hence, there are no strong external incentives for children to achieve well, 
because performance plays no major role in eligibility to the academic track 
and university.  
However, there is a widespread opinion that the academic track represents 
a kind of ‘natural choice’ for children with a high social background. If they 
perform poorly, these students might gain additional support (parent’s direct 
involvement, private lessons, etc.), settle for low grades, or move to less 
demanding schools. These suboptimal alternatives do not prevent them from 
enrolling at university. Furthermore, the children from advantaged 
backgrounds may rely on high-quality social capital as an additional key 
resource for finding a job in the Italian labour market that is characterized by 
a widespread use of personal ties in recruitment processes (Reyneri 2005) – 
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even on the high skills level (Rostan 2006). The case is different for students 
from disadvantaged backgrounds who normally choose the academic track 
and enter university only if they perceive themselves to be high performing 
or if they have particularly high aspirations of upward mobility.  
All things considered, the mix between the formal openness and the de 
facto high stratification of the Italian educational system may be a bad recipe 
for equality (and efficiency). On the one side, a strong divide in upper 
secondary educational programmes at an early age is likely to promote 
educational inequalities (e.g. Schütz et al. 2008); on the other side, ability 
restrictions are not necessarily detrimental to equality of opportunity (Contini 
and Scagni 2011). We are not advocating the enforcement of access 
restrictions in the Italian educational system. However, we do think that an 
extension of comprehensive education and compulsory schooling, together 
with some ability screening at university entrance, may represent an effective 
way to reduce inequalities and provide incentives for better learning. 
NOTES 
1 Only a small minority of students choose regional vocational education, but regional 
variations are large.  
2 Vocational education also offers a first qualification after three years that does not give 
access to higher education.  
3 The assessment involves the entire population of 10th graders. However, to avoid bias due to 
cheating, we analyse the random subsample taking the test under the supervision of external 
observers. First-generation migrant children are excluded from the analyses. 
4 Detailed results are reported in Tables A6–A7, and in Figure A2 in the online appendix, 
Contini and Triventi (2016).  
5 Grade retention is common: it is considered as a correct sanction for disruptive behaviour and 
poor school involvement, and a tool to help low-performing students catch up and overcome 
the learning gap. 
6 Detailed results are given in Table A12 and Figure A3 in the online appendix, Contini and 
Triventi (2016).  
7 If descending track changes are more frequent among low-performing students, the exclusion 
of dropouts is likely to yield conservative estimates of the incidence of descending track 
mobility.  
8 This result is in line with evidence from the PISA data (authors’ elaborations).  
9 In this sense, the reported figures should be considered as upper bounds of the true added 
value.  
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